Coleen Rowley's Memo to FBI Director Robert
Mueller An edited version of the
agent's 13-page letter
May 21, 2002
FBI Director Robert Mueller FBI Headquarters
Washington, D.C.
Dear Director Mueller:
I feel at this point that I have to put my concerns in writing
concerning the important topic of the FBI's response to evidence of
terrorist activity in the United States prior to September 11th. The
issues are fundamentally ones of INTEGRITY and go to the heart of
the FBI's law enforcement mission and mandate. Moreover, at this
critical juncture in fashioning future policy to promote the most
effective handling of ongoing and future threats to United States
citizens' security, it is of absolute importance that an unbiased,
completely accurate picture emerge of the FBI's current
investigative and management strengths and failures.
To get to the point, I have deep concerns that a delicate and
subtle shading/skewing of facts by you and others at the highest
levels of FBI management has occurred and is occurring. The term
"cover up" would be too strong a characterization which is why I am
attempting to carefully (and perhaps over laboriously) choose my
words here. I base my concerns on my relatively small, peripheral
but unique role in the Moussaoui investigation in the Minneapolis
Division prior to, during and after September 11th and my analysis
of the comments I have heard both inside the FBI (originating, I
believe, from you and other high levels of management) as well as
your Congressional testimony and public comments.
I feel that certain facts, including the following, have, up to
now, been omitted, downplayed, glossed over and/or mis-characterized
in an effort to avoid or minimize personal and/or institutional
embarrassment on the part of the FBI and/or perhaps even for
improper political reasons:
1) The Minneapolis agents who responded to the call about
Moussaoui's flight training identified him as a terrorist threat
from a very early point. The decision to take him into custody on
August 15, 2001, on the INS "overstay" charge was a deliberate one
to counter that threat and was based on the agents' reasonable
suspicions. While it can be said that Moussaoui's overstay status
was fortuitous, because it allowed for him to be taken into
immediate custody and prevented him receiving any more flight
training, it was certainly not something the INS coincidentally
undertook of their own volition. I base this on the conversation I
had when the agents called me at home late on the evening Moussaoui
was taken into custody to confer and ask for legal advice about
their next course of action. The INS agent was assigned to the FBI's
Joint Terrorism Task Force and was therefore working in tandem with
FBI agents.
2) As the Minneapolis agents' reasonable suspicions quickly
ripened into probable cause, which, at the latest, occurred within
days of Moussaoui's arrest when the French Intelligence Service
confirmed his affiliations with radical fundamentalist Islamic
groups and activities connected to Osama Bin Laden, they became
desperate to search the computer lap top that had been taken from
Moussaoui as well as conduct a more thorough search of his personal
effects. The agents in particular believed that Moussaoui signaled
he had something to hide in the way he refused to allow them to
search his computer.
3) The Minneapolis agents' initial thought was to obtain a
criminal search warrant, but in order to do so, they needed to get
FBI Headquarters' (FBIHQ's) approval in order to ask for DOJ OIPR's
approval to contact the United States Attorney's Office in
Minnesota. Prior to and even after receipt of information provided
by the French, FBIHQ personnel disputed with the Minneapolis agents
the existence of probable cause to believe that a criminal violation
had occurred/was occurring. As such, FBIHQ personnel refused to
contact OIPR to attempt to get the authority. While reasonable minds
may differ as to whether probable cause existed prior to receipt of
the French intelligence information, it was certainly established
after that point and became even greater with successive, more
detailed information from the French and other intelligence sources.
The two possible criminal violations initially identified by
Minneapolis Agents were violations of Title 18 United States Code
Section 2332b (Acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries,
which, notably, includes "creating a substantial risk of serious
bodily injury to any other person by destroying or damaging any
structure, conveyance, or other real or personal property within the
United States or by attempting or conspiring to destroy or damage
any structure, conveyance, or other real or personal property within
the United States") and Section 32 (Destruction of aircraft or
aircraft facilities). It is important to note that the actual search
warrant obtained on September 11th was based on probable cause of a
violation of Section 32.1
Notably also, the actual search warrant obtained on September 11th
did not include the French intelligence information. Therefore, the
only main difference between the information being submitted to
FBIHQ from an early date which HQ personnel continued to deem
insufficient and the actual criminal search warrant which a federal
district judge signed and approved on September 11th, was the fact
that, by the time the actual warrant was obtained, suspected
terrorists were known to have highjacked planes which they then
deliberately crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
To say then, as has been iterated numerous times, that probable
cause did not exist until after the disasterous event occurred, is
really to acknowledge that the missing piece of probable cause was
only the FBI's (FBIHQ's) failure to appreciate that such an event
could occur. The probable cause did not otherwise improve or change.
When we went to the United States Attorney's Office that morning of
September 11th, in the first hour after the attack, we used a disk
containing the same information that had already been provided to
FBIHQ; then we quickly added Paragraph 19 which was the little we
knew from news reports of the actual attacks that morning. The
problem with chalking this all up to the "20-20 hindsight is
perfect" problem, (which I, as all attorneys who have been involved
in deadly force training or the defense of various lawsuits are
fully appreciative of), is that this is not a case of everyone in
the FBI failing to appreciate the potential consequences. It is
obvious, from my firsthand knowledge of the events and the detailed
documentation that exists, that the agents in Minneapolis who were
closest to the action and in the best position to gauge the
situation locally, did fully appreciate the terrorist risk/danger
posed by Moussaoui and his possible co-conspirators even prior to
September 11th. Even without knowledge of the Phoenix communication
(and any number of other additional intelligence communications that
FBIHQ personnel were privy to in their central coordination roles),
the Minneapolis agents appreciated the risk. So I think it's very
hard for the FBI to offer the "20-20 hindsight" justification for
its failure to act! Also intertwined with my reluctance in this case
to accept the "20-20 hindsight" rationale is first-hand knowledge
that I have of statements made on September 11th, after the first
attacks on the World Trade Center had already occurred, made
telephonically by the FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) who was
the one most involved in the Moussaoui matter and who, up to that
point, seemed to have been consistently, almost deliberately
thwarting the Minneapolis FBI agents' efforts (see number 5). Even
after the attacks had begun, the SSA in question was still
attempting to block the search of Moussaoui's computer,
characterizing the World Trade Center attacks as a mere coincidence
with Misseapolis' prior suspicions about Moussaoui.2
4) In one of my peripheral roles on the Moussaoui matter, I
answered an e-mail message on August 22, 2001, from an attorney at
the National Security Law Unit (NSLU). Of course, with (ever
important!) 20-20 hindsight, I now wish I had taken more time and
care to compose my response. When asked by NSLU for my "assessment
of (our) chances of getting a criminal warrant to search Moussaoui's
computer", I answered, "Although I think there's a decent chance of
being able to get a judge to sign a criminal search warrant, our
USAO seems to have an even higher standard much of the time, so
rather than risk it, I advised that they should try the other
route." Leaked news accounts which said the Minneapolis Legal
Counsel (referring to me) concurred with the FBIHQ that probable
cause was lacking to search Moussaoui's computer are in error. (or
possibly the leak was deliberately skewed in this fashion?) What I
meant by this pithy e-mail response, was that although I thought
probable cause existed ("probable cause" meaning that the
proposition has to be more likely than not, or if quantified, a 51%
likelihood), I thought our United States Attorney's Office, (for a
lot of reasons including just to play it safe) in regularly
requiring much more than probable cause before approving affidavits,
(maybe, if quantified, 75%-80% probability and sometimes even
higher), and depending on the actual AUSA who would be assigned,
might turn us down. As a tactical choice, I therefore thought it
would be better to pursue the "other route" (the FISA search
warrant) first, the reason being that there is a common perception,
which for lack of a better term, I'll call the "smell test" which
has arisen that if the FBI can't do something through straight-up
criminal methods, it will then resort to using less-demanding
intelligence methods. Of course this isn't true, but I think the
perception still exists. So, by this line of reasoning, I was afraid
that if we first attempted to go criminal and failed to convince an
AUSA, we wouldn't pass the "smell test" in subsequently seeking a
FISA. I thought our best chances therefore lay in first seeking the
FISA. Both of the factors that influenced my thinking are areas
arguably in need of improvement: requiring an excessively high
standard of probable cause in terrorism cases and getting rid of the
"smell test" perception. It could even be argued that FBI agents,
especially in terrorism cases where time is of the essence, should
be allowed to go directly to federal judges to have their probable
cause reviewed for arrests or searches without having to gain the
USAO's approval.4
5) The fact is that key FBIHQ personnel whose job it was to
assist and coordinate with field division agents on terrorism
investigations and the obtaining and use of FISA searches (and who
theoretically were privy to many more sources of intelligence
information than field division agents), continued to, almost
inexplicably,5
throw up roadblocks and undermine Minneapolis' by-now desperate
efforts to obtain a FISA search warrant, long after the French
intelligence service provided its information and probable cause
became clear. HQ personnel brought up almost ridiculous questions in
their apparent efforts to undermine the probable cause.6
In all of their conversations and correspondence, HQ personnel never
disclosed to the Minneapolis agents that the Phoenix Division had,
only approximately three weeks earlier, warned of Al Qaeda
operatives in flight schools seeking flight training for terrorist
purposes!
Nor did FBIHQ personnel do much to disseminate the information
about Moussaoui to other appropriate intelligence/law enforcement
authorities. When, in a desperate 11th hour measure to bypass the
FBIHQ roadblock, the Minneapolis Division undertook to directly
notify the CIA's Counter Terrorist Center (CTC), FBIHQ personnel
actually chastised the Minneapolis agents for making the direct
notification without their approval!
6 ) Eventually on August 28, 2001, after a series of e-mails
between Minneapolis and FBIHQ, which suggest that the FBIHQ SSA
deliberately further undercut the FISA effort by not adding the
further intelligence information which he had promised to add that
supported Moussaoui's foreign power connection and making several
changes in the wording of the information that had been provided by
the Minneapolis Agent, the Minneapolis agents were notified that the
NSLU Unit Chief did not think there was sufficient evidence of
Moussaoui's connection to a foreign power. Minneapolis personnel
are, to this date, unaware of the specifics of the verbal
presentations by the FBIHQ SSA to NSLU or whether anyone in NSLU
ever was afforded the opportunity to actually read for him/herself
all of the information on Moussaoui that had been gathered by the
Minneapolis Division and the French intelligence service. Obviously
verbal presentations are far more susceptible to
mis-characterization and error. The e-mail communications between
Minneapolis and FBIHQ, however, speak for themselves and there are
far better witnesses than me who can provide their first hand
knowledge of these events characterized in one Minneapolis agent's
e-mail as FBIHQ is "setting this up for failure." My only comment is
that the process of allowing the FBI supervisors to make changes in
affidavits is itself fundamentally wrong, just as, in the follow-up
to FBI Laboratory Whistleblower Frederic Whitehurst's allegations,
this process was revealed to be wrong in the context of writing up
laboratory results. With the Whitehurst allegations, this process of
allowing supervisors to re-write portions of laboratory reports, was
found to provide opportunities for over-zealous supervisors to skew
the results in favor of the prosecution. In the Moussaoui case, it
was the opposite -- the process allowed the Headquarters Supervisor
to downplay the significance of the information thus far collected
in order to get out of the work of having to see the FISA
application through or possibly to avoid taking what he may have
perceived as an unnecessary career risk.7
I understand that the failures of the FBIHQ personnel involved in
the Moussaoui matter are also being officially excused because they
were too busy with other investigations, the Cole bombing and other
important terrorism matters, but the Supervisor's taking of the time
to read each word of the information submitted by Minneapolis and
then substitute his own choice of wording belies to some extent the
notion that he was too busy. As an FBI division legal advisor for 12
years (and an FBI agent for over 21 years), I can state that an
affidavit is better and will tend to be more accurate when the
affiant has first hand information of all the information he/she
must attest to. Of necessity, agents must continually rely upon
information from confidential sources, third parties and other law
enforcement officers in drafting affidavits, but the repeating of
information from others greatly adds to the opportunities for
factual discrepancies and errors to arise. To the extent that we can
minimize the opportunity for this type of error to arise by simply
not allowing unnecessary re-writes by supervisory staff, it ought to
be done. (I'm not talking, of course, about mere grammatical
corrections, but changes of some substance as apparently occurred
with the Moussaoui information which had to be, for lack of a better
term, "filtered" through FBIHQ before any action, whether to seek a
criminal or a FISA warrant, could be taken.) Even after September
11th, the fear was great on the part of Minneapolis Division
personnel that the same FBIHQ personnel would continue their
"filtering" with respect to the Moussaoui investigation, and now
with the added incentive of preventing their prior mistakes from
coming to light. For this reason, for weeks, Minneapolis prefaced
all outgoing communications (ECs) in the PENTTBOM investigation with
a summary of the information about Moussaoui. We just wanted to make
sure the information got to the proper prosecutive authorities and
was not further suppressed! This fear was probably irrational but
was nonetheless understandable in light of the Minneapolis agents'
prior experiences and frustrations involving FBIHQ. (The redundant
preface information regarding Moussaoui on otherwise unrelative
PENTTBOM communications has ended up adding to criminal discovery
issues, but this is the reason it was done.)
7) Although the last thing the FBI or the country needs now is a
witch hunt, I do find it odd that (to my knowledge) no inquiry
whatsoever was launched of the relevant FBIHQ personnel's actions a
long time ago. Despite FBI leaders' full knowledge of all the items
mentioned herein (and probably more that I'm unaware of), the SSA,
his unit chief, and other involved HQ personnel were allowed to stay
in their positions and, what's worse, occupy critical positions in
the FBI's SIOC Command Center post September 11th. (The SSA in
question actually received a promotion some months afterward!) It's
true we all make mistakes and I'm not suggesting that HQ personnel
in question ought to be burned at the stake, but, we all need to be
held accountable for serious mistakes. I'm relatively certain that
if it appeared that a lowly field office agent had committed such
errors of judgment, the FBI's OPR would have been notified to
investigate and the agent would have, at the least, been quickly
reassigned. I'm afraid the FBI's failure to submit this matter to
OPR (and to the IOB) gives further impetus to the notion (raised
previously by many in the FBI) of a double standard which results in
those of lower rank being investigated more aggressively and dealt
with more harshly for misconduct while the misconduct of those at
the top is often overlooked or results in minor disciplinary action.
From all appearances, this double standard may also apply between
those at FBIHQ and those in the field.
8) The last official "fact" that I take issue with is not really
a fact, but an opinion, and a completely unsupported opinion at
that. In the day or two following September 11th, you, Director
Mueller, made the statement to the effect that if the FBI had only
had any advance warning of the attacks, we (meaning the FBI), may
have been able to take some action to prevent the tragedy. Fearing
that this statement could easily come back to haunt the FBI upon
revelation of the information that had been developed pre-September
11th about Moussaoui, I and others in the Minneapolis Office,
immediately sought to reach your office through an assortment of
higher level FBIHQ contacts, in order to quickly make you aware of
the background of the Moussaoui investigation and forewarn you so
that your public statements could be accordingly modified. When such
statements from you and other FBI officials continued, we thought
that somehow you had not received the message and we made further
efforts. Finally when similar comments were made weeks later, in
Assistant Director Caruso's congressional testimony in response to
the first public leaks about Moussaoui we faced the sad realization
that the remarks indicated someone, possibly with your approval, had
decided to circle the wagons at FBIHQ in an apparent effort to
protect the FBI from embarrassment and the relevant FBI officials
from scrutiny. Everything I have seen and heard about the FBI's
official stance and the FBI's internal preparations in anticipation
of further congressional inquiry, had, unfortunately, confirmed my
worst suspicions in this regard. After the details began to emerge
concerning the pre-September 11th investigation of Moussaoui, and
subsequently with the recent release of the information about the
Phoenix EC, your statement has changed. The official statement is
now to the effect that even if the FBI had followed up on the
Phoenix lead to conduct checks of flight schools and the Minneapolis
request to search Moussaoui's personal effects and laptop, nothing
would have changed and such actions certainly could not have
prevented the terrorist attacks and resulting loss of life. With all
due respect, this statement is as bad as the first! It is also quite
at odds with the earlier statement (which I'm surprised has not
already been pointed out by those in the media!) I don't know how
you or anyone at FBI Headquarters, no matter how much genius or
prescience you may possess, could so blithely make this affirmation
without anything to back the opinion up than your stature as FBI
Director. The truth is, as with most predictions into the future, no
one will ever know what impact, if any, the FBI's following up on
those requests, would have had. Although I agree that it's very
doubtful that the full scope of the tragedy could have been
prevented, it's at least possible we could have gotten lucky and
uncovered one or two more of the terrorists in flight training prior
to September 11th, just as Moussaoui was discovered, after making
contact with his flight instructors. It is certainly not beyond the
realm of imagination to hypothesize that Moussaoui's fortuitous
arrest alone, even if he merely was the 20th hijacker, allowed the
hero passengers of Flight 93 to overcome their terrorist hijackers
and thus spare more lives on the ground. And even greater
casualties, possibly of our Nation's highest government officials,
may have been prevented if Al Qaeda intended for Moussaoui to pilot
an entirely different aircraft. There is, therefore at least some
chance that discovery of other terrorist pilots prior to September
11th may have limited the September 11th attacks and resulting loss
of life. Although your conclusion otherwise has to be very
reassuring for some in the FBI to hear being repeated so often (as
if saying it's so may make it so), I think your statements
demonstrate a rush to judgment to protect the FBI at all costs. I
think the only fair response to this type of question would be that
no one can pretend to know one way or another.
Mr. Director, I hope my observations can be taken in a
constructive vein. They are from the heart and intended to be
completely apolitical. Hopefully, with our nation's security on the
line, you and our nation's other elected and appointed officials can
rise above the petty politics that often plague other discussions
and do the right thing. You do have some good ideas for change in
the FBI but I think you have also not been completely honest about
some of the true reasons for the FBI's pre-September 11th failures.
Until we come clean and deal with the root causes, the Department of
Justice will continue to experience problems fighting terrorism and
fighting crime in general.
I have used the "we" term repeatedly herin to indicate facts
about others in the Minneapolis Office at critical times, but none
of the opinions expressed herin can be attributed to anyone but
myself. I know that those who know me would probably describe me as,
by nature, overly opinionated and sometimes not as discreet as I
should be. Certainly some of the above remarks may be interpreted as
falling into that category, but I really do not intend anything as a
personal criticism of you or anyone else in the FBI, to include the
FBIHQ personnel who I believe were remiss and mishandled their
duties with regard to the Moussaoui investigation. Truly my only
purpose is to try to provide the facts within my purview so that an
accurate assessment can be obtained and we can learn from our
mistakes. I have pointed out a few of the things that I think should
be looked at but there are many, many more.8
An honest acknowledgment of the FBI's mistakes in this and other
cases should not lead to increasing the Headquarters bureaucracy and
approval levels of investigative actions as the answer. Most often,
field office agents and field office management on the scene will be
better suited to the timely and effective solution of crimes and, in
some lucky instances, to the effective prevention of crimes,
including terrorism incidents. The relatively quick solving of the
recent mailbox pipe-bombing incidents which resulted in no serious
injuries to anyone are a good example of effective field office work
(actually several field offices working together) and there are
hundreds of other examples. Although FBIHQ personnel have, no doubt,
been of immeasurable assistance to the field over the years, I'm
hard pressed to think of any case which has been solved by FBIHQ
personnel and I can name several that have been screwed up!
Decision-making is inherently more effective and timely when
decentralized instead of concentrated.
Your plans for an FBI Headquarters' "Super Squad" simply fly in
the face of an honest appraisal of the FBI's pre-September 11th
failures. The Phoenix, Minneapolis and Paris Legal Attache Offices
reacted remarkably exhibiting keen perception and prioritization
skills regarding the terrorist threats they uncovered or were made
aware of pre-September 11th. The same cannot be said for the FBI
Headquarters' bureaucracy and you want to expand that?! Should we
put the counterterrorism unit chief and SSA who previously handled
the Moussaoui matter in charge of the new "Super Squad"?! You are
also apparently disregarding the fact the Joint Terrorism Task
Forces (JTTFs), operating out of field divisions for years, (the
first and chief one being New York City's JTTF), have successfully
handled numerous terrorism investigations and, in some instances,
successfully prevented acts of terrorism. There's no denying the
need for more and better intelligence and intelligence management,
but you should think carefully about how much gate keeping power
should be entrusted with any HQ entity. If we are indeed in a "war",
shouldn't the Generals be on the battlefield instead of sitting in a
spot removed from the action while still attempting to call the
shots?
I have been an FBI agent for over 21 years and, for what it's
worth, have never received any form of disciplinary action
throughout my career. From the 5th grade, when I first wrote the FBI
and received the "100 Facts about the FBI" pamphlet, this job has
been my dream. I feel that my career in the FBI has been somewhat
exemplary, having entered on duty at a time when there was only a
small percentage of female Special Agents. I have also been lucky to
have had four children during my time in the FBI and am the sole
breadwinner of a family of six. Due to the frankness with which I
have expressed myself and my deep feelings on these issues, (which
is only because I feel I have a somewhat unique, inside perspective
of the Moussaoui matter, the gravity of the events of September 11th
and the current seriousness of the FBI's and United States' ongoing
efforts in the "war against terrorism"), I hope my continued
employment with the FBI is not somehow placed in jeopardy. I have
never written to an FBI Director in my life before on any topic.
Although I would hope it is not necessary, I would therefore wish to
take advantage of the federal "Whistleblower Protection" provisions
by so characterizing my remarks.
Sincerely
Coleen M. Rowley Special Agent and Minneapolis Chief
Division Counsel
NOTES
1) And both of the violations originally cited in
vain by the Minneapolis agents disputing the issue with FBIHQ
personnel are among those on which Moussaoui is currently indicted.
2) Just minutes after I saw the first news of the
World Trade Center attack(s), I was standing outside the office of
Minneapolis ASAC M. Chris Briesse waiting for him to finish with a
phone call, when he received a call on another line from this SSA.
Since I figured I knew what the call may be about and wanted to ask,
in light of the unfolding events and the apparent urgency of the
situation, if we should now immediately attempt to obtain a criminal
search warrant for Moussaoui's laptop and personal property, I took
the call. I said something to the effect that, in light of what had
just happened in New York, it would have to be the "hugest
coincidence" at this point if Moussaoui was not involved with the
terrorists. The SSA stated something to the effect that I had used
the right term, "coincidence" and that this was probably all just a
coincidence and we were to do nothing in Minneapolis until we got
their (HQ's) permission because we might "screw up" something else
going on elsewhere in the country.
4) Certainly Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure which begins, "Upon the request of a federal law
enforcement officer or an
attorney for the government" does not contain this requirement.
Although the practice that has evolved is that FBI agents must
secure prior approval for any search or arrest from the United
States Attorneys Office, the Federal Rule governing Search and
Seizure clearly envisions law enforcement officers applying, on
their own, for search warrants.
5) During the early aftermath of September 11th,
when I happened to be recounting the pre-September 11th events
concerning the Moussaoui investigation to other FBI personnel in
other divisions or in FBIHQ, almost everyone's first question was
"Why?--Why would an FBI agent(s) deliberately sabotage a case? (I
know I shouldn't be flippant about this, but jokes were actually
made that the key FBIHQ personnel had to be spies or moles, like
Robert Hansen, who were actually working for Osama Bin Laden to have
so undercut Minneapolis' effort.) Our best real guess, however, is
that, in most cases avoidance of all "unnecessary" actions/decisions
by FBIHQ managers (and maybe to some extent field managers as well)
has, in recent years, been seen as the safest FBI career course.
Numerous high-ranking FBI officials who have made decisions or have
taken actions which, in hindsight, turned out to be mistaken or just
turned out badly (i.e. Ruby Ridge, Waco, etc.) have seen their
careers plummet and end. This has in turn resulted in a climate of
fear which has chilled aggressive FBI law enforcement
action/decisions. In a large hierarchal bureaucracy such as the FBI,
with the requirement for numerous superiors approvals/oversight, the
premium on career-enhancement, and interjecting a chilling factor
brought on by recent extreme public and congressional
criticism/oversight, and I think you will see at least the makings
of the most likely explanation. Another factor not to be
underestimated probably explains the SSA and other FBIHQ personnel's
reluctance to act. And so far, I have heard no FBI official even
allude to this problem-- which is that FBI Headquarters is staffed
with a number of short term careerists* who, like the SSA in
question, must only serve an 18
month-just-time-to-get-your-ticket-punched minimum. It's no wonder
why very little expertise can be acquired by a Headquarters unit!
(And no wonder why FBIHQ is mired in mediocrity! -- that maybe a
little strong, but it would definitely be fair to say that there is
unevenness in competency among Headquarters personnel.) (It's also a
well known fact that the FBI Agents Association has complained for
years about the disincentives facing those entering the FBI
management career path which results in very few of the FBI's best
and brightest choosing to go into management. Instead the ranks of
FBI management are filled with many who were failures as street
agents. Along these lines, let me ask the question, why has it
suddenly become necessary for the Director to "handpick" the FBI
management?) It's quite conceivable
that many of the HQ personnel who so vigorously disputed Moussaoui's
ability/predisposition to fly a plane into a building were simply
unaware of all the various incidents and reports worldwide of Al
Qaeda terrorists attempting or plotting to do so.
*By the way, just in the event you did not know, let me furnish
you the Webster's definition of "careerism - - the policy or
practice of advancing one's career often at the cost of one's
integrity". Maybe that sums up the whole problem!
6) For example, at one point, the Supervisory
Special Agent at FBIHQ posited that the French information could be
worthless because it only identified Zacarias Moussaoui by name and
he, the SSA, didn't know how many people by that name existed in
France. A Minneapolis agent attempted to surmount that problem by
quickly phoning the FBI's legal Attache (Legat) in Paris, France, so
that a check could be made of the French telephone directories.
Although the Legat in France did not have access to all of the
French telephone directories, he was able to quickly ascertain that
there was only one listed in the Paris directory. It is not known if
this sufficiently answered the question, for the SSA continued to
find new reasons to stall.
7) Another factor that cannot be underestimated as
to the HQ Supervisor's apparent reluctance to do anything was/is the
ever present risk of being "written up" for an Intelligence
Oversight Board (IOB) "error." In the year(s) preceding the
September 11th acts of terrorism, numerous alleged IOB violations on
the part of FBI personnel had to be submitted to the FBI's Office of
Professional Responsibility (OPR) as well as the IOB. I believe the
chilling effect upon all levels of FBI agents assigned to
intelligence matters and their manager hampered us from aggressive
investigation of terrorists. Since one generally only runs the risk
of IOB violations when one does something, the safer course is to do
nothing. Ironically, in this case, a potentially huge IOB violation
arguably occurred due to FBIHQ's failure to act, that is, FBIHQ's
failure to inform the Department of Justice Criminal Division of
Moussaoui's potential criminal violations (which, as I've already
said, were quickly identified in Minneapolis as violations of Title
18 United States Code Section 2332b [Acts of terrorism transcending
national boundaries] and Section 32 [Destruction of aircraft or
aircraft facilities]). This failure would seem to run clearly afoul
of the Attorney General directive contained in the "1995 Procedures
for Contacts Between the FBI and the Criminal Division Concerning
Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations"
which mandatorily require the FBI to notify the Criminal Division
when "facts or circumstances are developed" in an FI or FCI
investigation "that reasonably indicate that a significant federal
crime has been, is being, or may be committed." I believe that
Minneapolis agents actually brought this point to FBIHQ's attention
on August 22, 2001, but HQ personnel apparently ignored the
directive, ostensibly due to their opinion of the lack of probable
cause. But the issue of whether HQ personnel deliberately undercut
the probable cause can be sidestepped at this point because the
Directive does not require probable cause. It requires only a
"reasonable indication" which is defined as "substantially lower
than probable cause." Given that the Minneapolis Division had
accumulated far more than "a mere hunch" (which the directive would
deem as insufficient), the information ought to have, at least, been
passed on to the "Core Group" created to assess whether the
information needed to be further disseminated to the Criminal
Division. However, (and I don't know for sure), but to date, I have
never heard that any potential violation of this directive has been
submitted to the IOB or to the FBI's OPR. It should also be noted
that when making determinations of whether items need to be
submitted to the IOB, it is my understanding that NSLU normally
used/uses a broad approach, erring, when in doubt, on the side of
submitting potential violations.
8) For starters, if prevention rather than
prosecution is to be our new main goal, (an objective I totally
agree with), we need more guidance on when we can apply the Quarles
"public safety" exception to Miranda's 5th Amendment requirements.
We were prevented from even
attempting to question Moussaoui on the day of the attacks when, in
theory, he could have possessed further information about other
co-conspirators. (Apparently no government attorney believes
there is a "public safety" exception in a situation like this?!)
The
State of our Defense The
Bush Administration believes al-Qaeda is poised to strike the U.S.
again, but has it done enough to improve homeland security?