The forensic scientist Claire Glynn estimated that more than 40 million people have sent in their DNA and personal data for direct-to-consumer genetic testing, mostly to map their ancestry and find relatives. Since 2020, at least two genetic genealogy firms have been hacked and at least one had its genomic data leaked. Yet when discussing future risks of genetic technology, the security policy community has largely focused on spectacular scenarios of genetically tailored bioweapons or artificial intelligence (AI) engineered superbugs. A more imminent weaponization concern is more straightforward: the risk that nefarious actors use the genetic techniques ... to frame, defame, or even assassinate targets. A Russian parliamentary report from 2023 claimed that "by using foreign biological facilities, the United States can collect and study pathogens that can infect a specific genotype of humans." Designer bioweapons, if ever successfully developed, produced, and tested, would indeed pose a major threat. Unscrupulous actors with access to DNA synthesis infrastructure could ... frame someone for a crime such as murder, for example, by using DNA that synthetically reproduces the DNA regions used in forensic crime analysis. The research and policy communities must dedicate resources not simply to dystopian, low-probability threats like AI designed bioweapons, but also to gray zone genomics and smaller-scale, but higher probability, scenarios for misuse.