The
Truth About the Drug Companies
By Marcia Angell, M.D.
10-Page Summary
Exposes a Major Health Cover-up
For a two-page summary of the health cover-up, click here
"The combined profits for the ten drug companies in the Fortune 500 ($35.9 billion) were more than the profits for all the other 490 businesses put together ($33.7 billion) [in 2002]. Over the past two decades the pharmaceutical industry has moved very far from its original high purpose of discovering and producing useful new drugs. Now primarily a marketing machine to sell drugs of dubious benefit, this industry uses its wealth and power to co-opt every institution that might stand in its way, including the US Congress, the FDA, academic medical centers, and the medical profession itself."
Summary below
from New York Review of Books
Volume 51, Number 12 · July 15, 2004
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17244
The
Truth About the Drug Companies
Marcia Angell
is a former editor
in chief of the prestigious The New England Journal of Medicine.
She is currently a senior lecturer in social medicine at Harvard Medical School.
Her latest book is The Truth About the Drug Companies: How They Deceive
Us and What to Do About It. Before the summary begins, here are excerpts
from the book reviews of three leading US newspapers:
New
York Times: "A scorching indictment of drug companies and their research
and business practices...tough, persuasive and troubling."
Boston
Globe: "A sober, clear-eyed attack on the excesses of drug company power...a
lucid, persuasive, and highly important book."
Washington
Post: "Always authoritative...[this book] delivers the message—that
drug-company money and power is corrupting American medicine—in a convincing,
no-nonsense manner."
Part 1
Every day
Americans are subjected to a barrage of advertising by the pharmaceutical
industry. Mixed in with the pitches for a particular drug—usually featuring
beautiful people enjoying themselves in the great outdoors—is a more
general message. Boiled down to its essentials, it is this: "Yes, prescription
drugs are expensive, but that shows how valuable they are. Besides, our research
and development costs are enormous, and we need to cover them somehow. As
'research-based' companies, we turn out a steady stream of innovative medicines
that lengthen life, enhance its quality, and avert more expensive medical
care. You are the beneficiaries of this ongoing achievement of the American
free enterprise system, so be grateful, quit whining, and pay up." More
prosaically, what the industry is saying is that you get what you pay for.
Is any of
this true? Well, the first part certainly is. Prescription drug costs are
indeed high—and rising fast. Americans now spend a staggering $200 billion
a year on prescription drugs, and that figure is growing at a rate of about
12 percent a year (down from a high of 18 percent in 1999). [1] Drugs are the
fastest-growing part of the health care bill—which itself is rising
at an alarming rate. The increase in drug spending reflects, in almost
equal parts, the facts that people are taking a lot more drugs than they used
to, that those drugs are more likely to be expensive new ones instead of older,
cheaper ones, and that the prices of the most heavily prescribed drugs are
routinely jacked up, sometimes several times a year.
Before its
patent ran out, for example, the price of Schering-Plough's top-selling allergy
pill, Claritin, was raised thirteen times over five years, for a cumulative
increase of more than 50 percent—over four times the rate of general
inflation. [2] As a spokeswoman for one company explained, "Price increases
are not uncommon in the industry and this allows us to be able to invest in
R&D." [3] In 2002, the average price of the fifty drugs most used
by senior citizens was nearly $1,500 for a year's supply. (Pricing varies
greatly, but this refers to what the companies call the average wholesale
price, which is usually pretty close to what an individual without insurance
pays at the pharmacy.)
Paying for prescription drugs is no longer a problem just for poor people.
As the economy continues to struggle, health insurance is shrinking.
Employers are requiring workers to pay more of the costs themselves, and
many businesses are dropping health benefits altogether. Since prescription
drug costs are rising so fast, payers are particularly eager to get out
from under them by shifting costs to individuals. The result is that more
people have to pay a greater fraction of their drug bills out of pocket.
And that packs a wallop.
Many of them simply can't do it. They trade off drugs against home heating
or food. Some people try to string out their drugs by taking them less
often than prescribed, or sharing them with a spouse. Others, too
embarrassed to admit that they can't afford to pay for drugs, leave their
doctors' offices with prescriptions in hand but don't have them filled. Not
only do these patients go without needed treatment but their doctors
sometimes wrongly conclude that the drugs they prescribed haven't worked
and prescribe yet others—thus compounding the problem.
The people
hurting most are the elderly. When Medicare was enacted in 1965, people
took far fewer prescription drugs and they were cheap. For that reason, no
one thought it necessary to include an outpatient prescription drug benefit
in the program. In those days, senior citizens could generally afford to buy
whatever drugs they needed out of pocket. Approximately half to two thirds
of the elderly have supplementary insurance that partly covers prescription
drugs, but that percentage is dropping as employers and insurers decide it
is a losing proposition for them. At the end of 2003, Congress passed a Medicare
reform bill that included a prescription drug benefit scheduled to begin in
2006, but as we shall see later, its benefits are inadequate to begin with
and will quickly be overtaken by rising prices and administrative costs.
For obvious
reasons, the elderly tend to need more prescription drugs than younger people—mainly
for chronic conditions like arthritis, diabetes, high blood pressure, and
elevated cholesterol. In 2001, nearly one in four seniors reported that they
skipped doses or did not fill prescriptions because of the cost. (That fraction
is almost certainly higher now.) Sadly, the frailest are the least likely
to have supplementary insurance. At an average cost of $1,500 a year for
each drug, someone without supplementary insurance who takes six different
prescription drugs—and this is not rare—would have to spend $9,000
out of pocket. Not many among the old and frail have such deep pockets.
Furthermore, in one of the more perverse of the pharmaceutical industry's
practices, prices are much higher for precisely the people who most need
the drugs and can least afford them. The industry charges Medicare
recipients without supplementary insurance much more than it does favored
customers, such as large HMOs or the Veterans Affairs (VA) system. Because
the latter buy in bulk, they can bargain for steep discounts or rebates.
People without insurance have no bargaining power; and so they pay the
highest prices.
In the past
two years, we have started to see, for the first time, the beginnings of public
resistance to rapacious pricing and other dubious practices of the pharmaceutical
industry. It is mainly because of this resistance that drug companies are
now blanketing us with public relations messages. And the magic words,
repeated over and over like an incantation, are research, innovation, and
American. Research. Innovation. American. It makes a great story.
But while
the rhetoric is stirring, it has very little to do with reality. First, research
and development (R&D) is a relatively small part of the budgets of the
big drug companies—dwarfed by their vast expenditures on marketing and
administration, and smaller even than profits. In fact, year after year,
for over two decades, this industry has been far and away the most profitable
in the United States. (In 2003, for the first time, the industry lost its
first-place position, coming in third, behind "mining, crude oil production,"
and "commercial banks.") The prices drug companies charge have little
relationship to the costs of making the drugs and could be cut dramatically
without coming anywhere close to threatening R&D.
Second, the
pharmaceutical industry is not especially innovative. As hard as it is to
believe, only a handful of truly important drugs have been brought to market
in recent years, and they were mostly based on taxpayer-funded research at
academic institutions, small biotechnology companies, or the National Institutes
of Health (NIH). The great majority of "new" drugs are not new
at all but merely variations of older drugs already on the market. These are
called "me-too" drugs. The idea is to grab a share of an established,
lucrative market by producing something very similar to a top-selling drug.
For instance, we now have six statins (Mevacor, Lipitor, Zocor, Pravachol,
Lescol, and the newest, Crestor) on the market to lower cholesterol, all variants
of the first. As Dr. Sharon Levine, associate executive director of the Kaiser
Permanente Medical Group, put it:
"If
I'm a manufacturer and I can change one molecule and get another twenty years
of patent rights, and convince physicians to prescribe and consumers to demand
the next form of Prilosec, or weekly Prozac instead of daily Prozac, just
as my patent expires, then why would I be spending money on a lot less certain
endeavor, which is looking for brand-new drugs?" [4]
Third, the industry is hardly a model of American free enterprise. To be
sure, it is free to decide which drugs to develop (me-too drugs instead of
innovative ones, for instance), and it is free to price them as high as the
traffic will bear, but it is utterly dependent on government-granted
monopolies—in the form of patents and Food and Drug Administration
(FDA)—approved exclusive marketing rights. If it is not particularly
innovative in discovering new drugs, it is highly innovative— and
aggressive—in dreaming up ways to extend its monopoly rights.
And there
is nothing peculiarly American about this industry. It is the very essence
of a global enterprise. Roughly half of the largest drug companies are
based in Europe. (The exact count shifts because of mergers.) In 2002,
the top ten were the American companies Pfizer, Merck, Johnson & Johnson,
Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Wyeth (formerly American Home Products); the British
companies GlaxoSmithKline and AstraZeneca; the Swiss companies Novartis and
Roche; and the French company Aventis (which in 2004 merged with another French
company, Sanafi Synthelabo, putting it in third place). [5] All are much alike
in their operations. All price their drugs much higher here than in other
markets.
Since the
United States is the major profit center, it is simply good public relations
for drug companies to pass themselves off as American, whether they are or
not. It is true, however, that some of the European companies are now locating
their R&D operations in the United States. They claim the reason for this
is that we don't regulate prices, as does much of the rest of the world. But
more likely it is that they want to feed on the unparalleled research output
of American universities and the NIH. In other words, it's not private enterprise
that draws them here but the very opposite—our publicly sponsored research
enterprise.
Over the
past two decades the pharmaceutical industry has moved very far from its original
high purpose of discovering and producing useful new drugs. Now primarily
a marketing machine to sell drugs of dubious benefit, this industry uses its
wealth and power to co-opt every institution that might stand in its way,
including the US Congress, the FDA, academic medical centers, and the medical
profession itself. (Most of its marketing efforts are focused on influencing
doctors, since they must write the prescriptions.)
If prescription drugs were like ordinary consumer goods, all this might not
matter very much. But drugs are different. People depend on them for their
health and even their lives. In the words of Senator Debbie Stabenow
(D-Mich.), "It's not like buying a car or tennis shoes or peanut butter."
People need to know that there are some checks and balances on this
industry, so that its quest for profits doesn't push every other
consideration aside. But there aren't such checks and balances.
Part 2
What does
the eight-hundred-pound gorilla do? Anything it wants to.
What's true
of the eight-hundred-pound gorilla is true of the colossus that is the pharmaceutical
industry. It is used to doing pretty much what it wants to do. The watershed
year was 1980. Before then, it was a good business, but afterward, it was
a stupendous one. From 1960 to 1980, prescription drug sales were fairly
static as a percent of US gross domestic product, but from 1980 to 2000, they
tripled. They now stand at more than $200 billion a year. [6] Of the many
events that contributed to the industry's great and good fortune, none had
to do with the quality of the drugs the companies were selling.
The claim that drugs are a $200 billion industry is an understatement.
According to government sources, that is roughly how much Americans spent
on prescription drugs in 2002. That figure refers to direct consumer
purchases at drugstores and mail-order pharmacies (whether paid for out of
pocket or not), and it includes the nearly 25 percent markup for
wholesalers, pharmacists, and other middlemen and retailers. But it does
not include the large amounts spent for drugs administered in hospitals,
nursing homes, or doctors' offices (as is the case for many cancer drugs).
In most analyses, they are allocated to costs for those facilities.
Drug company revenues (or sales) are a little different, at least as they
are reported in summaries of corporate annual reports. They usually refer
to a company's worldwide sales, including those to health facilities. But
they do not include the revenues of middlemen and retailers.
Perhaps the most quoted source of statistics on the pharmaceutical
industry, IMS Health, estimated total worldwide sales for prescription
drugs to be about $400 billion in 2002. About half were in the United
States. So the $200 billion colossus is really a $400 billion megacolossus.
The election
of Ronald Reagan in 1980 was perhaps the fundamental element in the rapid
rise of big pharma—the collective name for the largest drug companies.
With the Reagan administration came a strong pro-business shift not only in
government policies but in society at large. And with the shift, the public
attitude toward great wealth changed. Before then, there was something faintly
disreputable about really big fortunes. You could choose to do well or you
could choose to do good, but most people who had any choice in the matter
thought it difficult to do both. That belief was particularly strong among
scientists and other intellectuals. They could choose to live a comfortable
but not luxurious life in academia, hoping to do exciting cutting-edge research,
or they could "sell out" to industry and do less important but more
remunerative work. Starting in the Reagan years and continuing through
the 1990s, Americans changed their tune. It became not only reputable to be
wealthy, but something close to virtuous. There were "winners" and
there were "losers," and the winners were rich and deserved to be.
The gap between the rich and poor, which had been narrowing since World War
II, suddenly began to widen again, until today it is a chasm.
The pharmaceutical industry and its CEOs quickly joined the ranks of the
winners as a result of a number of business-friendly government actions. I
won't enumerate all of them, but two are especially important. Beginning in
1980, Congress enacted a series of laws designed to speed the translation
of tax-supported basic research into useful new products—a process
sometimes referred to as "technology transfer." The goal was also
to
improve the position of American-owned high-tech businesses in world
markets.
The most important
of these laws is known as the Bayh-Dole Act, after its chief sponsors, Senator
Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) and Senator Robert Dole (R-Kans.). Bayh-Dole enabled universities
and small businesses to patent discoveries emanating from research sponsored
by the National Institutes of Health, the major distributor of tax dollars
for medical research, and then to grant exclusive licenses to drug companies.
Until then, taxpayer-financed discoveries were in the public domain, available
to any company that wanted to use them. But now universities, where most
NIH-sponsored work is carried out, can patent and license their discoveries,
and charge royalties. Similar legislation permitted the NIH itself to enter
into deals with drug companies that would directly transfer NIH discoveries
to industry.
Bayh-Dole gave a tremendous boost to the nascent biotechnology industry,
as
well as to big pharma. Small biotech companies, many of them founded by
university researchers to exploit their discoveries, proliferated rapidly.
They now ring the major academic research institutions and often carry out
the initial phases of drug development, hoping for lucrative deals with big
drug companies that can market the new drugs. Usually both academic
researchers and their institutions own equity in the biotechnology
companies they are involved with. Thus, when a patent held by a university
or a small biotech company is eventually licensed to a big drug company,
all parties cash in on the public investment in research.
These laws mean that drug companies no longer have to rely on their own
research for new drugs, and few of the large ones do. Increasingly, they
rely on academia, small biotech startup companies, and the NIH for that. [7]
At least a third of drugs marketed by the major drug companies are now
licensed from universities or small biotech companies, and these tend to be
the most innovative ones. [8] While Bayh-Dole was clearly a bonanza for big
pharma and the biotech industry, whether its enactment was a net benefit to
the public is arguable.
The Reagan
years and Bayh-Dole also transformed the ethos of medical schools and teaching
hospitals. These nonprofit institutions started to see themselves as "partners"
of industry, and they became just as enthusiastic as any entrepreneur about
the opportunities to parlay their discoveries into financial gain. Faculty
researchers were encouraged to obtain patents on their work (which were assigned
to their universities), and they shared in the royalties. Many medical
schools and teaching hospitals set up "technology transfer" offices
to help in this activity and capitalize on faculty discoveries. As the entrepreneurial
spirit grew during the 1990s, medical school faculty entered into other lucrative
financial arrangements with drug companies, as did their parent institutions.
One of
the results has been a growing pro-industry bias in medical research—exactly
where such bias doesn't belong. Faculty members who had earlier contented
themselves with what was once referred to as a "threadbare but genteel"
lifestyle began to ask themselves, in the words of my grandmother, "If
you're so smart, why aren't you rich?" Medical schools and teaching hospitals,
for their part, put more resources into searching for commercial opportunities.
Starting in
1984, with legislation known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress passed another
series of laws that were just as big a bonanza for the pharmaceutical industry.
These laws extended monopoly rights for brand-name drugs. Exclusivity is the
lifeblood of the industry because it means that no other company may sell
the same drug for a set period. After exclusive marketing rights expire, copies
(called generic drugs) enter the market, and the price usually falls to as
little as 20 percent of what it was. [9] There are two forms of monopoly rights—patents
granted by the US Patent and Trade Office (USPTO) and exclusivity granted
by the FDA. While related, they operate somewhat independently, almost as
backups for each other. Hatch-Waxman, named for Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)
and Representative Henry Waxman (D-Calif.), was meant mainly to stimulate
the foundering generic industry by short-circuiting some of the FDA requirements
for bringing generic drugs to market. While successful in doing that, Hatch-Waxman
also lengthened the patent life for brand-name drugs. Since then, industry
lawyers have manipulated some of its provisions to extend patents far longer
than the lawmakers intended.
In the
1990s, Congress enacted other laws that further increased the patent life
of brand-name drugs. Drug companies now employ small armies of lawyers to
milk these laws for all they're worth—and they're worth a lot. The result
is that the effective patent life of brand-name drugs increased from about
eight years in 1980 to about fourteen years in 2000. [10] For a blockbuster—usually
defined as a drug with sales of over a billion dollars a year (like Lipitor
or Celebrex or Zoloft)—those six years of additional exclusivity are
golden. They can add billions of dollars to sales—enough to buy a lot
of lawyers and have plenty of change left over. No wonder big pharma will
do almost anything to protect exclusive marketing rights, despite the fact
that doing so flies in the face of all its rhetoric about the free market.
As their profits
skyrocketed during the 1980s and 1990s, so did the political power of drug
companies. By 1990, the industry had assumed its present contours as a business
with unprecedented control over its own fortunes. For example, if it didn't
like something about the FDA, the federal agency that is supposed to regulate
the industry, it could change it through direct pressure or through its friends
in Congress. The top ten drug companies (which included European companies)
had profits of nearly 25 percent of sales in 1990, and except for a dip
at the time of President Bill Clinton's health care reform proposal, profits
as a percentage of sales remained about the same for the next decade. (Of
course, in absolute terms, as sales mounted, so did profits.) In 2001,
the ten American drug companies in the Fortune 500 list ranked far above all
other American industries in average net return, whether as a percentage of
sales (18.5 percent), of assets (16.3 percent), or of shareholders' equity
(33.2 percent). These are astonishing margins. For comparison, the
median net return for all other industries in the Fortune 500 was only 3.3
percent of sales. Commercial banking, itself no slouch as an aggressive
industry with many friends in high places, was a distant second, at 13.5 percent
of sales. [11]
In 2002, as
the economic downturn continued, big pharma showed only a slight drop in profits—from
18.5 to 17.0 percent of sales. The most startling fact about 2002 is that
the combined profits for the ten drug companies in the Fortune 500 ($35.9
billion) were more than the profits for all the other 490 businesses put together
($33.7 billion). [12] In 2003 profits of the Fortune 500 drug companies
dropped to 14.3 percent of sales, still well above the median for all industries
of 4.6 percent for that year. When I say this is a profitable industry, I
mean really profitable. It is difficult to conceive of how awash in money
big pharma is.
Drug industry
expenditures for research and development, while large, were consistently
far less than profits. For the top ten companies, they amounted to only 11
percent of sales in 1990, rising slightly to 14 percent in 2000. The biggest
single item in the budget is neither R&D nor even profits but something
usually called "marketing and administration"—a name that
varies slightly from company to company. In 1990, a staggering 36 percent
of sales revenues went into this category, and that proportion remained about
the same for over a decade. [13] Note that this is two and a half times the
expenditures for R&D.
These figures are drawn from the industry's own annual reports to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and to stockholders, but what
actually goes into these categories is not at all clear, because drug
companies hold that information very close to their chests. It is likely,
for instance, that R&D includes many activities most people would consider
marketing, but no one can know for sure. For its part, "marketing and
administration" is a gigantic black box that probably includes what the
industry calls "education," as well as advertising and promotion,
legal
costs, and executive salaries—which are whopping. According to a report
by the non-profit group Families USA, the former chairman and CEO of
Bristol-Myers Squibb, Charles A. Heimbold Jr., made $74,890,918 in 2001,
not counting his $76,095,611 worth of unexercised stock options. The
chairman of Wyeth made $40,521,011, exclusive of his $40,629,459 in stock
options. And so on. [14]
Part 3
If 1980 was
a watershed year for the pharmaceutical industry, 2000 may very well turn
out to have been another one—the year things began to go wrong. As the
booming economy of the late 1990s turned sour, many successful businesses
found themselves in trouble. And as tax revenues dropped, state governments
also found themselves in trouble. In one respect, the pharmaceutical industry
is well protected against the downturn, since it has so much wealth and power.
But in another respect, it is peculiarly vulnerable, since it depends on employer-sponsored
insurance and state-run Medicaid programs for much of its revenues. When employers
and states are in trouble, so is big pharma.
And sure enough, in just the past couple of years, employers and the
private health insurers with whom they contract have started to push back
against drug costs. Most big managed care plans now bargain for steep price
discounts. Most have also instituted three-tiered coverage for prescription
drugs—full coverage for generic drugs, partial coverage for useful
brand-name drugs, and no coverage for expensive drugs that offer no added
benefit over cheaper ones. These lists of preferred drugs are called
formularies, and they are an increasingly important method for containing
drug costs. Big pharma is feeling the effects of these measures, although
not surprisingly, it has become adept at manipulating the system—mainly
by inducing doctors or health plans to put expensive, brand-name drugs on
formularies.
State governments,
too, are looking for ways to cut their drug costs. Some state legislatures
are drafting measures that would permit them to regulate prescription drug
prices for state employees, Medicaid recipients, and the uninsured. Like managed
care plans, they are creating formularies of preferred drugs. The industry
is fighting these efforts—mainly with its legions of lobbyists and lawyers.
It fought the state of Maine all the way to the US Supreme Court, which in
2003 upheld Maine's right to bargain with drug companies for lower prices,
while leaving open the details. But that war has just begun, and it promises
to go on for years and get very ugly.
Recently the
public has shown signs of being fed up. The fact that Americans pay much
more for prescription drugs than Europeans and Canadians is now widely known.
An estimated one to two million Americans buy their medicines from Canadian
drugstores over the Internet, despite the fact that in 1987, in response to
heavy industry lobbying, a compliant Congress had made it illegal for anyone
other than manufacturers to import prescription drugs from other countries.
[15] In addition, there is a brisk traffic in bus trips for people in border
states, particularly the elderly, to travel to Canada or Mexico to buy prescription
drugs. Their resentment is palpable, and they constitute a powerful voter
block—a fact not lost on Congress or state legislatures.
The industry faces other, less familiar problems. It happens that, by
chance, some of the top-selling drugs—with combined sales of around $35
billion a year—are scheduled to go off patent within a few years of one
another. [16] This drop over the cliff began in 2001, with the expiration of
Eli Lilly's patent on its blockbuster antidepressant Prozac. In the same
year, AstraZeneca lost its patent on Prilosec, the original "purple pill"
for heartburn, which at its peak brought in a stunning $6 billion a year.
Bristol-Myers Squibb lost its best-selling diabetes drug, Glucophage. The
unusual cluster of expirations will continue for another couple of years.
While it represents a huge loss to the industry as a whole, for some
companies it's a disaster. Schering-Plough's blockbuster allergy drug,
Claritin, brought in fully a third of that company's revenues before its
patent expired in 2002. [17] Claritin is now sold over the counter for much
less than its prescription price. So far,
the company has been unable to make up for the loss by trying to switch
Claritin users to Clarinex—a drug that is virtually identical but has the
advantage of still being on patent.
Even worse
is the fact that there are very few drugs in the pipeline ready to take
the place of blockbusters going off patent. In fact, that is the biggest problem
facing the industry today, and its darkest secret. All the public relations
about innovation is meant to obscure precisely this fact. The stream of
new drugs has slowed to a trickle, and few of them are innovative in any sense
of that word. Instead, the great majority are variations of oldies but goodies—"me-too"
drugs.
Of the
78 drugs approved by the FDA in 2002, only 17 contained new active ingredients,
and only seven of these were classified by the FDA as improvements over older
drugs. The other 71 drugs approved that year were variations of old drugs
or deemed no better than drugs already on the market. In other words, they
were me-too drugs. Seven of 78 is not much of a yield. Furthermore, of those
seven, not one came from a major US drug company. [18]
For the first
time, in just a few short years, the gigantic pharmaceutical industry is finding
itself in serious difficulty. It is facing, as one industry spokesman put
it, "a perfect storm." To be sure, profits are still beyond anything
most other industries could hope for, but they have recently fallen, and for
some companies they fell a lot. And that is what matters to investors. Wall
Street doesn't care how high profits are today, only how high they will be
tomorrow. For some companies, stock prices have plummeted. Nevertheless, the
industry keeps promising a bright new day. It bases its reassurances on the
notion that the mapping of the human genome and the accompanying burst in
genetic research will yield a cornucopia of important new drugs. Left unsaid
is the fact that big pharma is depending on government, universities, and
small biotech companies for that innovation. While there is no doubt that
genetic discoveries will lead to treatments, the fact remains that it will
probably be years before the basic research pays off with new drugs. In the
meantime, the once-solid foundations of the big pharma colossus are shaking.
The hints of trouble and the public's growing resentment over high prices
are producing the first cracks in the industry's formerly firm support in
Washington. In 2000, Congress passed legislation that would have closed
some of the loopholes in Hatch-Waxman and also permitted American
pharmacies, as well as individuals, to import drugs from certain countries
where prices are lower. In particular, they could buy back FDA-approved
drugs from Canada that had been exported there. It sounds silly to
"reimport" drugs that are marketed in the United States, but even
with the
added transaction costs, doing so is cheaper than buying them here. But the
bill required the secretary of health and human services to certify that
the practice would not pose any "added risk" to the public, and
secretaries
in both the Clinton and Bush administrations, under pressure from the
industry, refused to do that.
The industry
is also being hit with a tidal wave of government investigations and civil
and criminal lawsuits. The litany of charges includes illegally overcharging
Medicaid and Medicare, paying kickbacks to doctors, engaging in anticompetitive
practices, colluding with generic companies to keep generic drugs off the
market, illegally promoting drugs for unapproved uses, engaging in misleading
direct-to-consumer advertising, and, of course, covering up evidence. Some
of the settlements have been huge. TAP Pharmaceuticals, for instance, paid
$875 million to settle civil and criminal charges of Medicaid and Medicare
fraud in the marketing of its prostate cancer drug, Lupron. [19] All of
these efforts could be summed up as increasingly desperate marketing and patent
games, activities that always skirted the edge of legality but now are sometimes
well on the other side.
How is the pharmaceutical industry responding to its difficulties? One
could hope drug companies would decide to make some changes—trim their
prices, or at least make them more equitable, and put more of their money
into trying to discover genuinely innovative drugs, instead of just talking
about it. But that is not what is happening. Instead, drug companies are
doing more of what got them into this situation. They are marketing their
me-too drugs even more relentlessly. They are pushing even harder to extend
their monopolies on top-selling drugs. And they are pouring more money into
lobbying and political campaigns. As for innovation, they are still waiting
for Godot.
The news is
not all bad for the industry. The Medicare prescription drug benefit enacted
in 2003, and scheduled to go into effect in 2006, promises a windfall for
big pharma since it forbids the government from negotiating prices. The
immediate jump in pharmaceutical stock prices after the bill passed indicated
that the industry and investors were well aware of the windfall. But at best,
this legislation will be only a temporary boost for the industry. As costs
rise, Congress will have to reconsider its industry-friendly decision to allow
drug companies to set their own prices, no questions asked.
This is an industry that in some ways is like the Wizard of Oz—still full
of bluster but now being exposed as something far different from its image.
Instead of being an engine of innovation, it is a vast marketing machine.
Instead of being a free market success story, it lives off
government-funded research and monopoly rights. Yet this industry occupies
an essential role in the American health care system, and it performs a
valuable function, if not in discovering important new drugs at least in
developing them and bringing them to market. But big pharma is
extravagantly rewarded for its relatively modest functions. We get nowhere
near our money's worth. The United States can no longer afford it in its
present form.
Clearly,
the pharmaceutical industry is due for fundamental reform. Reform will have
to extend beyond the industry to the agencies and institutions it has co-opted,
including the FDA and the medical profession and its teaching centers.
In my book, The Truth About the Drug Companies, I discuss the major reforms
that will be necessary.
For example, we need to get the industry to focus on discovering truly
innovative drugs instead of turning out me-too drugs (and spending billions
of dollars to promote them as though they were miracles). The me-too
business is made possible by the fact that the FDA usually approves a drug
only if it is better than a placebo. It needn't be better than an older
drug already on the market to treat the same condition; in fact, it may be
worse. There is no way of knowing, since companies generally do not test
their new drugs against older ones for the same conditions at equivalent
doses. (For obvious reasons, they would rather not find the answer.) They
should be required to do so.
The me-too
market would collapse virtually overnight if the FDA made approval of new
drugs contingent on their being better in some important way than older drugs
already on the market. Probably very few new drugs could meet that test.
By default, then, drug companies would have to concentrate on finding truly
innovative drugs, and we would finally find out whether this much-vaunted
industry is turning out better drugs. A welcome by-product of this reform
is that it would also reduce the incessant and enormously expensive marketing
necessary to jockey for position in the me-too market. Genuinely important
new drugs do not need much promotion (imagine having to advertise a cure
for cancer).
A second
important reform would be to require drug companies to open their books. Drug
companies reveal very little about the most crucial aspects of their business.
We know next to nothing about how much they spend to bring each drug to market
or what they spend it on. (We know that it is not $802 million, as some industry
apologists have recently claimed.) Nor do we know what their gigantic "marketing
and administration" budgets cover. We don't even know the prices they
charge their various customers. Perhaps most important, we do not know the
results of the clinical trials they sponsor—only those they choose to
make public, which tend to be the most favorable findings. (The FDA is not
allowed to reveal the results it has.) The industry claims all of this is
"proprietary" information. Yet, unlike other businesses, drug companies
are dependent on the public for a host of special favors—including the
rights to NIH-funded research, long periods of market monopoly, and multiple
tax breaks that almost guarantee a profit. Because of these special favors
and the importance of its products to public health, as well as the fact that
the government is a major purchaser of its products, the pharmaceutical industry
should be regarded much as a public utility.
These are
just two of many reforms I advocate in The Truth About the Drug Companies.
Some of the others have to do with breaking the dependence of the medical
profession on the industry and with the inappropriate control drug companies
have over the evaluation of their own products. The sort of thoroughgoing
changes required will take government action, which in turn will require strong
public pressure. It will be tough. Drug companies have the largest lobby in
Washington, and they give copiously to political campaigns. Legislators are
now so beholden to the pharmaceutical industry that it will be exceedingly
difficult to break its lock on them.
But the
one thing legislators need more than campaign contributions is votes. That
is why citizens should know what is really going on. Contrary to the industry's
public relations, they don't get what they pay for. The fact is that this
industry is taking us for a ride, and there will be no real reform without
an aroused and determined public to make it happen.
To order
Marcia Angell's The Truth About the Drug Companies: click
here
For more
on cover-ups affecting your health, see our Health Information Center:
http://www.WantToKnow.info/healthinformation
Notes
[1]
There are several sources of statistics on the size and growth of the industry.
One is IMS Health, a company that collects
and sells information on the global pharmaceutical industry. See
www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/front/articleC/0,2777,6599_3665_41336931,00.html
for the $200 billion figure. For further sources on this and other matters,
see my book The Truth About the Drug Companies: How They Deceive Us and
What to Do About It, from which this article is drawn.
[2]
For a full picture of the special burden of rising drug prices on senior citizens,
see Families USA, "Out-of-Bounds: Rising Prescription Drug Prices for Seniors"
www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/Out_of_Boundsab79.pdf
[3]
Sarah Lueck, "Drug Prices Far Outpace Inflation,"
Wall
Street Journal, July 10, 2003, p. D2.
[4]
On ABC
Special with Peter Jennings, "Bitter Medicine: Pills, Profit, and the
Public Health," May 29, 2002.
[5]
For the top ten companies and their recent mergers as of 2003, see www.oligopolywatch.com/2003/05/25.html.
[6]
These figures come from the US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
Office of the Actuary, National Health Statistics Group, Baltimore, Maryland.
They were summarized in Cynthia Smith, "Retail
Prescription Drug Spending in the National Health Accounts," Health
Affairs, January/February 2004, p. 160.
[7]
For excellent summaries of public contributions to drug company research,
see Public Citizen Congress Watch, "Rx
R&D Myths: The Case Against the Drug Industry's R&D 'Scare Card,'"
July 2001 (www.citizen.org); and NIHCM,
"Changing Patterns of
Pharmaceutical Innovation," May 2002 (www.nihcm.org).
[8]
This is probably an underestimate. One source that indicates it is at least
this is CenterWatch, www.centerwatch.com,
a private company owned by Thomson Medical Economics, which provides information
to the clinical trial industry. See An
Industry in Evolution, third edition, edited by Mary Jo Lamberti (CenterWatch,
2001), p. 22.
[9]
Families USA, "Out-of-Bounds: Rising Prescription Drug Prices for Seniors."
[10]
Public
Citizen Congress Watch, "Rx R&D Myths."
[11]
"The
Fortune 500," Fortune,
April 15, 2002, p. F26.
[12]
Public Citizen Congress Watch, "Drug Industry Profits: Hefty Pharmaceutical
Company Margins Dwarf Other Industries," June 2003, www.citizen.org/documents/Pharma_Report.pdf.
The data are drawn mainly from the Fortune
500 list in Fortune, April 7, 2003, and drug company annual reports.
[13]
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, "Prescription
Drug Trends," November 2001, www.kff.org
[14]
FamiliesUSA, "Profiting from Pain: Where Prescription Drug Dollars Go," July
2002:
www.familiesusa.org/resources/tools-for-advocates/tips/profiting-from-pain-talking-points.html
[15]
Patricia Barry, "More Americans Go North for Drugs," AARP
Bulletin, April 2003, p. 3.
[16]
Chandrani Ghosh and Andrew Tanzer, "Patent Play," Forbes,
September 17, 2001, p. 141.
[17]
Gardiner Harris, "Schering-Plough Is Hurt by Plummeting Pill Costs,"
New York Times, July 8, 2003, p. C1.
[18]
For key information about the numbers and kinds of drugs approved each year,
see the Web site of the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/pstable.htm.
[19]
Alice Dembner, "Drug
Firm to Pay $875M Fine for Fraud," Boston Globe, October 4, 2001,
p. A13.