The secret war of the DEA in Mexico
Article by Mexican newspaper El Universal
Note: This article is no longer available on El Universal. However, we've saved an original version of the article through Internet Archive. This article investigates how US agencies allowed the Sinaloa drug cartel to carry out its operations from 2000 to 2012 in exchange for intel on rival cartels while also pumping billions into Mexican law enforcement and military to fight organized crime.
In Mexican territory, agents from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and prosecutors from the Department of Justice secretly met and negotiated with members of drug cartels to obtain information on rival organizations, a situation that escalated violence across the country, according to an investigation by EL UNIVERSAL. The DEA, the Department of Justice, and other U.S. agencies contacted about these meetings with drug traffickers declined to comment.
For a year, this newspaper obtained official and judicial documents from Mexico and the United States, interviewed over a hundred active and retired officials from both countries, as well as detainees, their families, and specialists, though only those who agreed to be identified are included here.
No Mexican authority reported these meetings to Congress, and no investigation has been opened in Mexico regarding these meetings on Mexican soil.
Judicial documents, which this outlet possesses, indicate that the U.S. government was aware of and authorized the meetings and negotiations with members of Mexican cartels, particularly the Sinaloa cartel, to gather information on their rivals. This led to the seizure of shipments and arrests, triggering violence in Mexico during the administrations of Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón.
During these two PAN administrations, U.S. prosecutors such as Steve Fraga, and DEA agents including Manuel Castañón, David Herrod, and Carlos Mitchem, who was an assistant regional director, met with drug traffickers in Mexico. David Gaddis, then the DEA Regional Director based in Mexico City, and other agency officials in the U.S. authorized their agents to meet with cartel members without informing the Mexican government and allowed, under written agreements, for the traffickers to continue their operations.
"In large part because we are there [in Mexico] to collect intelligence to support investigations in the United States. In that sense, I have interviewed several cartel members and drug traffickers like Zambada-Niebla in Mexico. It's not like interviewing a fugitive who walks into my office in San Diego. In San Diego, I can arrest the fugitive. In Mexico, I can't," said DEA agent Manuel Castañón in his written statement submitted in the Vicente Zambada Niebla case in Chicago.
In response, Rusty Payne, a spokesperson for the DEA, stated that "the DEA will not comment on these ongoing reports. Mr. (David) Gaddis no longer works for the DEA."
In Colombia, the DEA, along with other U.S. agencies, gathered information on rival organizations against Pablo Escobar, working closely with Colombian police. This work was described as highly important and a great success by Myles Frechette, former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia. "The drug trafficking problem continues in Colombia, but there has been a reduction in cocaine and other drug trafficking," Frechette added in an interview with this outlet.
The DEA has operated similarly in Colombia since the 1980s, as well as in Cambodia, Thailand, and for over ten years in Afghanistan; it is the agency's standard modus operandi, explained Edgardo Buscaglia, a professor at Columbia University. "Of course, this modus operandi involves a violation of public international law, and it adds more fuel to the fire of violence, with violations of due process and human rights," Buscaglia highlighted. He added that the DEA's actions violate the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime "since it requires that all transnational investigations by one state within the sovereign territory of another state always adhere to the legal framework in the territory where the investigative techniques are implemented."
In this regard, criminal lawyer Juan Velázquez noted that international treaties signed by Mexico and other countries allow foreign agents to be in Mexico, subject to Mexican authorities, and simply act as information gatherers without acting independently. "Neither bilateral cooperation agreements nor other 'things' override the Constitution, which is the supreme law. If our authorities allow otherwise, they act illegally and are subject to accountability, but how can they be held accountable if such agreements and actions are secret and therefore nothing is known about them?" he said.
The Secret War
At the beginning of Enrique Peña Nieto's presidency, there were growing concerns in the U.S. about the new PRI administration potentially negotiating with drug cartels to curb violence. However, the U.S. government had already been engaged in such negotiations.
Between 2000 and 2012, particularly during Felipe Calderón's presidency from 2006 to 2012, the U.S. government established unprecedented collaboration agreements with Mexico to combat drug trafficking. Simultaneously, it orchestrated a covert war in Mexico through its agents who met directly with cartel members.
DEA agents, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers, and Department of Justice prosecutors were authorized by the U.S. to meet with drug traffickers in Mexico, according to judicial documents. In June 2009, an agreement between the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security granted DEA and ICE agents authority to investigate drug trafficking suspects both at the border and internationally, resolving a long-standing dispute between these agencies.
Without Mexican authorities present, as required by bilateral agreements, and without informing the Mexican government, DEA agents met with cartel members in Mexico to gather information on rival organizations. They also established a network of informants among drug traffickers, who signed cooperation agreements based on results, which included potential benefits like dropping charges in the U.S.
Occasionally, DEA or U.S. government-provided information from these meetings was shared with the Mexican government, without citing the source, to facilitate arrests by Mexican police or military. During Calderón's presidency, 12 significant drug trafficker arrests were attributed to the DEA, according to the agency’s reports.
One case revealing these negotiations occurred in late November 2006, at the end of Vicente Fox's term, when the body of a man was found in "El Chamizal" park near the Córdoba-Las Américas International Bridge connecting Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua with El Paso, Texas.
On the man's face were taped the business cards of ICE narcotics agents Raúl Bencomo and Tod Johnson, as well as an index finger in the deceased's mouth. The two ICE agents were implicated during the trial in the U.S. of Guillermo Eduardo Ramírez Peyro, identified as a paid informant for ICE and a member of the Juárez cartel. Ramírez Peyro led authorities to a residence in the Las Acequias neighborhood of Ciudad Juárez where 12 bodies were found in January 2004, a location that became known as "the house of death," as previously reported.
In March 2010, Jesús Manuel Fierro Méndez, a member of the Sinaloa cartel and former captain of the Ciudad Juárez police, testified in El Paso that he acted as a spokesperson for "El Chapo" Guzmán during numerous phone conversations and personal meetings with ICE agents. "There were two of us who were, let's say, spokespeople. We passed all the information. But we obviously received this information from higher levels," Fierro Méndez stated, claiming that "El Chapo" authorized him to meet with ICE and report on rival cartels' activities.
The Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office launched an investigation into the improper handling of sources by ICE agents who met and negotiated with Sinaloa cartel members for information on rival groups. The names of the agents involved were not made public.
Between 2009 and 2011, DEA agents in the Houston office established direct contacts with key members of the Gulf cartel and "Los Zetas" to gather information on rival organizations, but the names of the agents and informants have not been released.
"The U.S. government and its various agencies have a long history of providing benefits, permits, and immunity to criminals and their organizations to commit crimes, including murder, in exchange for information against other criminals and organizations," stated Zambada Niebla’s defense in document 94.
This tactic, the defense notes, has been extensively used by the Department of Justice and its various agencies in the "war on drugs" with little concern for the loss of lives in both Mexico and the U.S., or for the ongoing drug trafficking into the U.S. or its consumption. "This strategy, which they call 'Divide and Conquer' by using one drug trafficking organization against another, is exactly what the Department of Justice and its various agencies have implemented in Mexico," the defense added.
According to Edgardo Buscaglia, an intelligence strategy where a country uses one criminal group to eliminate another is not inappropriate as long as the strategy is implemented by a state with relatively effective judicial, asset, and political corruption controls.
"But if the United States tries to apply this strategy in a country like Mexico, where these three types of controls are glaringly absent, the result will be that the 'used' criminal group will de facto become the primary concentration of power. I fear that this may be the case with the Sinaloa criminal organization," he emphasized.
The case that has detailed the DEA agents' tactics for meeting and negotiating with cartel members in Mexico is the judicial process involving Vicente Zambada Niebla, son of Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada, one of the leaders of the Sinaloa cartel, in a court in Chicago, Illinois.
Statements and documents presented since 2009 in the trial against Zambada Niebla have led to pressure from U.S. authorities on their main informant, requests for information about DEA agents' meetings with drug traffickers in Mexico, the agreements reached, a deeper investigation by the U.S. Congress into the "Fast and Furious" operation, and the U.S. government's refusal to disclose details about operations in Mexico.
It has become clear that DEA agents met with high-level members of the Sinaloa cartel more than 50 times in Mexican territory, according to court documents that include statements from the agents and U.S. officials themselves.
Secret Agreements
On March 18, 2009, at 12:05 a.m. in a room at the Sheraton Hotel, DEA agents Manuel Castañón and David Herrod met for 30 minutes with Vicente Zambada Niebla and attorney Humberto Loya-Castro, who were identified as members of the Sinaloa cartel in the U.S. and Mexico.
The meeting, planned three months in advance and last-minute canceled by David Gaddis, the DEA regional director based at the U.S. embassy in Mexico due to a leak to a newspaper, could not be avoided by the drug agents when Vicente Zambada arrived with Loya Castro. Five hours later, Zambada Niebla was arrested by the Mexican Army.
But the story began years earlier when, in 1995, the U.S. government initiated a case in the Southern District of California against Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán Loera and the lawyer of the "Sinaloa Cartel," Humberto Loya Castro.
By the late 1990s, in an effort to resolve the charges against him, lawyer Loya Castro met in Monterrey, Nuevo León, with U.S. agents, according to defense and prosecution documents in the case against Vicente Zambada.
"Chapo gave his approval, and Mr. Loya-Castro began to provide information he received from El Chapo to the agents," stated lawyer Fernando A. Gaxiola in his declaration on October 24, 2011, who served as a legal interpreter for Vicente Zambada-Niebla’s defense.
Loya-Castro refused to provide information about the Sinaloa cartel but continued to provide information on rival cartels. By the mid-2000s, he met with DEA agents to discuss the charges against him.
"The agents also advised Mr. Loya-Castro to be careful when talking on the phone with El Chapo because they might be overheard by Mexican authorities, and he should be particularly cautious about the information he conveyed to El Chapo over the phone," revealed Gaxiola.
However, the first formal collaboration agreement between Loya-Castro and the DEA was recorded in mid-2005 through DEA agent Manuel Castañón, who would later identify Loya-Castro in various documents as a "cooperating source" or CS, for its English abbreviation.
"In 2005, when I started working in Hermosillo, one of my first tasks assigned by my supervisor was to finalize an agreement with an information source who had been providing intermittent information to the DEA and ICE for several years," detailed Agent Castañón in his written declaration dated December 2, 2011, and submitted to the Chicago court in the Zambada-Niebla case.
On June 3, 2005, Loya-Castro signed a "Confidential Cooperation Agreement" with the U.S. Department of Justice through the DEA, with agents Manuel Castañón, David Herrod, and Greg Garza as signatories.
In document 109 presented by the U.S. prosecution on September 9, 2011, it is noted that Loya-Castro signed multiple confidential cooperation agreements with the DEA between 2005 and 2011.
The confidential cooperation agreements, copies of which are held by this outlet, specify that Loya-Castro committed unconditionally to provide information, act under U.S. government supervision, perform illicit activities specifically authorized by his controlling investigator, and all without expecting anything in return.
"Loya continued his activities with the Sinaloa cartel, with the knowledge of the U.S. government, without being arrested or prosecuted," highlighted Zambada-Niebla's defense in document number 94, a 16-page document dated July 29, 2011, in the case against Ismael Zambada's son, case number 09-CR-00383.
Mr. Loya-Castro "testified that he provided significant information to the agents that he relayed from El Chapo, El Mayo, and Mr. Zambada-Niebla, which resulted in numerous arrests of key figures from rival narcotic organizations," explained Gaxiola.
According to lawyer Gaxiola, Zambada-Niebla provided information to Loya-Castro about a leading narcotrafficker from a rival cartel, for Loya-Castro to pass on to DEA agents, which helped in the apprehension of that individual.
"Mr. Loya-Castro stated that under this agreement with the government, the charges against him were dismissed in 2008," noted lawyer Gaxiola, who was an interpreter during meetings between U.S. attorneys for Zambada and Loya at the "Four Seasons" hotel in Mexico City on March 9 and July 14, 2010.
In this regard, DEA agent Manuel Castañón confirmed that in 2008 his DEA supervisors recommended to the U.S. Attorney that the charges against Loya-Castro be dropped.
"I supported dismissing the charges due to the extraordinary cooperation that the CS (Loya-Castro) had provided over many years and because the CS was not an operational narcotrafficker (as opposed to someone like Zambada-Niebla, whom I view differently)," stated Agent Castañón.
Additionally, he mentioned that he knew the final decision to recommend dismissing the charges was up to his boss David Gaddis, and the decision to act to dismiss the charges was made by the U.S. Attorney's office.
"After dismissing the charges, the CS continued to provide me with information. I continued to work with him/her," said Agent Castañón, who in his statements tried to avoid giving details that would identify Loya-Castro as a person.
Meanwhile, Loya-Castro informed the Sinaloa cartel that he was still in regular contact with Manuel Castañón and the DEA, and continued to provide information about rival groups.
"He stated that he met with U.S. agents at least 50 times, made hundreds of phone calls, and sent numerous emails to agents," mentioned lawyer Gaxiola.
Subsequent to the agreement, Loya-Castro arranged for Vicente Zambada-Niebla to meet with U.S. agents around March 2009 so that he could directly provide information to the DEA and secure a cooperation agreement with the U.S. government similar to the one Loya-Castro had, which led to the dismissal of the charges against him.
DEA-Zambada
In January 2009, Loya-Castro met with DEA agents to discuss the possibility of introducing Vicente Zambada-Niebla, who was interested in cooperating with the U.S. government, according to U.S. Prosecutor’s document 109.
The meeting with Zambada-Niebla originated from a contact made by DEA agent Manuel Castañón with Loya-Castro on January 30, 2009, in Mexico City, according to Castañón’s own statement.
"During the meeting with CS (Loya-Castro), I believe agent Herrod and Carlos Mitchem, the regional director’s assistant, were also present. CS told me that he/she had been instructed by Joaquín Guzmán Loera to meet with Zambada-Niebla. Guzmán Loera had informed CS that Ismael Zambada-García was interested in having his son, Zambada-Niebla, cooperate with the DEA," explained Castañón.
At that time, agent Castañón learned that Zambada-Niebla had been indicted in the District Court of Columbia, so he told Loya-Castro that he would look into the possibility of a meeting with Zambada, but he could not make any promises about the value of the cooperation.
Additionally, DEA agent Castañón mentioned that he was aware that the assistant U.S. attorney and agent Steve Fraga from the District Court of Columbia advised against making promises to Zambada-Niebla but suggested listening to what he had to say.
"From then on, I contacted my boss, the resident agent in charge at the Tijuana office. Agent Herrod also contacted his supervisor. Ultimately, DEA management authorized an initial meeting between the agents, CS (Loya-Castro), and Zambada-Niebla to assess the information he might provide," Castañón noted.
Based on his discussions with agent Fraga and DEA management, Castañón said the initial meeting with Vicente Zambada-Niebla would be standard, aimed at exploring potential cooperation.
"It is common in an initial meeting with potential cooperating defendants that we attempt to obtain admissions of most of their possible criminal conduct, explore what types of information they might provide about the criminal conduct of others, make no promises to them, and speak as little as possible while listening as much as possible," Castañón specified.
On March 10, 2009, Castañón spoke with Loya-Castro, saying, "We discussed several locations for the meeting, but I insisted that any meeting should be held in Mexico City." Loya confirmed that Zambada-Niebla agreed, and March 15 was set for the meeting to take place on March 18.
"DEA agents in Mexico sought and obtained permission from DEA agents and prosecutors in Washington, DC, to conduct an introductory preliminary meeting with the defendant (Zambada-Niebla) to determine his interest in cooperating with the U.S. government and his viability. The agents arranged to meet with Loya-Castro and Zambada-Niebla in Mexico City on March 18, 2009," detailed the prosecution.
On the afternoon of March 17, 2009, DEA agents Manuel Castañón and David Herrod flew to Mexico City and met with DEA agents from Washington D.C. and the U.S. embassy in Mexico to make arrangements for the meeting with Loya-Castro and Vicente Zambada-Niebla, it added.
"On March 17, 2009, around 3:30 p.m., I arrived in Mexico City with agent Herrod. We then met with agent Fraga (who I believe was with another agent) and DEA agents operating outside of Mexico City," reported agent Castañón.
During the meeting, he recalled, "One of the supervisors in Mexico City asked us if we had seen a recently published article in the Mexican newspaper 'El Porvenir' about DEA agents traveling to Mexico to meet with high-ranking members of drug traffickers. I warned them that I had not seen it."
The prosecution stated that once at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, David Gaddis, the director of the DEA’s North and Central America region, met with agents Castañón and Herrod, expressing concern about U.S. agents meeting with a high-ranking member of the Sinaloa cartel like Zambada-Niebla, and instructed them not to meet until authorization was granted.
According to Loya-Castro's statement to Zambada’s defense, Manuel Castañón called him on the agreed day to inform him that the meeting was canceled "because an article published in a newspaper indicated a possible leak related to the meeting."
The article Gaddis referred to was from Friday, March 13, 2009, in the newspaper "El Porvenir," which reported that a special DEA team had been sent to Mexican territory to seek meetings with drug lords from various cartels to negotiate their voluntary surrender to U.S. authorities.
The article cited "high-level military and governmental sources" who participated a week earlier in a meeting in Mexico City with Admiral Mike Mullen, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mexican officials. The article went further to state that the Felipe Calderón government had authorized 62 U.S. anti-narcotics agents to operate in Mexico without Mexican authorities’ oversight and without needing to report their activities to the Mexican government. It also mentioned that information about the cartels they met with was considered confidential and deemed national security by the U.S. government.
While Agent Castañón insisted on canceling the meeting, Loya-Castro requested to address the matter personally and went to the Sheraton Hotel to explain that Zambada-Niebla had put himself at risk by traveling to Mexico City.
The Sheraton Meeting
At 11 p.m. on March 17, 2009, Agents Castañón and Herrod waited in the lobby of the Sheraton Hotel in Mexico City for Loya-Castro and then escorted him to their room, where they showed him the published article, reiterating that they could not meet with Zambada-Niebla without authorization.
Loya-Castro became nervous and insisted that the meeting take place, as he was personally responsible for Zambada-Niebla and had committed to this with Ismael Zambada-García, according to Agent Castañón’s statement.
Subsequently, Loya-Castro told Castañón and Herrod that he would need to inform Zambada-Niebla of the change in plans and left the room at 12:15 a.m. on March 18, promising to return in 20 minutes.
“At approximately 12:30, Agent Herrod returned to the room, accompanied by Loya-Castro and Zambada-Niebla. Agent Herrod said that instead of having a discussion in the lobby (and because Agent Herrod does not speak Spanish), he went to the elevator followed by Loya-Castro and Zambada-Niebla,” stated Castañón.
Inside the Sheraton Hotel room, both Agent Herrod and Agent Castañón searched Loya-Castro and Zambada-Niebla for weapons and confiscated their cell phones, according to Agent Castañón’s statement.
“On March 17, 2009, I met for about 30 minutes in a hotel room in Mexico City with Vicente Zambada-Niebla and two others—DEA Agent David Herrod and a cooperating source (CS) whom I have worked with since 2005. During the meeting on March 17, 2009, I spoke on behalf of the DEA. Agent Herrod does not speak Spanish,” detailed Agent Castañón.
Initially, the drug agent informed Loya-Castro and Zambada-Niebla that he could not meet with them until he had approval from DEA Headquarters and showed them the newspaper article.
“Zambada-Niebla told me that he had driven from Guadalajara and that no one knew about the meeting except his father, Loya-Castro, and Guzmán Loera. He wanted to personally convey that he was serious about cooperating and was willing to do whatever it took to reach an agreement with the U.S. government,” mentioned Castañón.
In the following minutes, they discussed the charges against Zambada-Niebla in Washington, D.C., the legal process involving being a cooperating source in the United States, a potential future meeting in another country or the U.S., and that Agent Castañón could not make any promises or guarantees, the agent explained in his court testimony.
“Toward the end of the approximately 30 minutes, we returned to the fact that I was not supposed to have met with him, which could cause me problems. I was concerned about the repercussions with the DEA because I was not supposed to be meeting with Zambada-Niebla. I told him I would contact the CS (Loya-Castro) if we wanted to arrange a meeting. Then I told Zambada-Niebla and the CS that they should leave, and the meeting ended,” added Agent Castañón.
Hours after that meeting, the drug agent learned of Vicente Zambada-Niebla’s arrest by Mexican army personnel in the Jardines del Pedregal neighborhood in Mexico City.
“The next day, three other DEA agents and I met with Zambada-Niebla in the prison where he was held. He reiterated his desire to cooperate. He said he did not want to be in Mexico. That was the last time I spoke with him,” recounted Agent Castañón.
For the agent, it was clear that with the authorization to meet with Zambada-Niebla in March 2009, and even before the appointment was canceled, “we were tasked with having an initial meeting with him, listening to him, and not promising him anything.”
“The only thing I authorized regarding Zambada-Niebla was that if Agent Steve Fraga went to Mexico in March 2009 in an attempt to interview Zambada-Niebla and obtain admissions from him,” stated Patrick H. Hearn, then Assistant U.S. Attorney, Criminal Division, Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Section (NDDS).
Prosecutor Hearn said in his Chicago court testimony that he regarded Zambada-Niebla as “a significant drug trafficker and an important member of the Sinaloa cartel.”
The authorization for the meeting was partly because Agent Fraga informed Prosecutor Hearn that Loya-Castro “had provided information that led to the seizure of 23 tons of cocaine, as well as other seizures related to the Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes drug organization, and information related to the Arturo Beltrán Leyva organization.”
Threats
After Zambada-Niebla’s arrest, his U.S. attorneys began requesting, among other things, documents about Loya-Castro and his relationship with the DEA as well as with other agencies, and the role he played on behalf of the Sinaloa cartel.
The U.S. attorneys were warned by DEA Agent Manuel Castañón, via Loya-Castro, that if they proceeded, “many people would be exposed, potentially causing harm to Loya-Castro, his family, Mayo, El Chapo, and even the U.S. attorneys would be at risk,” according to attorney Gaxiola’s statement.
Additionally, they were informed that if Castañón’s “relationship with the Sinaloa Cartel, and with the U.S. government was exposed, and if Mr. Loya-Castro’s activities of providing information about other rival cartels were exposed, it would not only be bad for him but for the U.S. government as well, as they did not want anyone to know about their relationship with the leaders of the Sinaloa Cartel,” mentioned Gaxiola.
The use of members of criminal organizations against others by U.S. authorities is done more frequently than it should be, explained Robert Mazur, a retired DEA agent who participated undercover in a financial operation against the Medellín cartel.
“We need to be very careful when using high-level individuals against other criminal organizations,” Mazur said, referring to the case of Whitey Bulger, the Boston mafia boss who manipulated U.S. federal agents by providing information about rival Italian mafia organizations.
At the beginning of the current administration, the number of DEA agents in Mexico decreased, as did the number of Mexican police assigned to "Sensitive Investigation Units" (SIU) operating in Mexican territory and directed by drug agents. However, it is unclear whether the DEA still maintains contacts with drug cartels in search of sensitive information.
